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The Setting

The City of Parkland, a municipal corporation, was incorporated in 1963 with approximately 500 residents. The 2002 and 2003 population varies by source; however, the City of Parkland notes that the 2003 population is 21,000. Located in northwest Broward County, Parkland encompasses approximately 11 square miles.

According to city officials, the population of Parkland is anticipated to reach 32,000 in 10 years. The increased population is likely to place new and different challenges on the city, especially in the provision of fire protection and emergency medical services.

A number of officials noted that approximately 80 percent of Parkland residents live within ‘gated’ communities. This controlled access is important in considering public safety models. For example, in the experiences of the Study Team, residents in gated communities and communities with limited road access typically have fewer crime and safety problems.

City Governance

The governing and lawmaking body of the City of Parkland is the City Commission, which consists of four members and a Mayor. The Mayor and each of the City Commissioners are elected for a four-year term.

The City Manager is responsible for the day-to-day administration of city government. The City Manager and City Clerk report to the City Commission.

The Director of the Public Safety Department currently reports to the City Manager. Initially, the director position reported to the City Commission; however, the Commission transferred that responsibility in the late 1990s to the City Manager. The position of director is also referred to as chief.



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Delivery of Public Safety Services in Parkland

The City of Parkland has been providing uniformed police and fire services through members (public safety officers) who are trained in both law enforcement and fire protection. For fire protection, public safety officers in patrol cars respond to a fire call, don fire clothing from the trunk of their patrol cars, assess the situation, and take whatever actions possible until a fire engine arrives to take appropriate measures for fires in buildings or brush fires. This is not a standard model for fire protection services in the U.S.

In order to become a public safety officer in Parkland, an applicant without certification in police or fire must attend a police academy and then a fire academy. With field training, it could take approximately one year for a new applicant to be certified in both law enforcement and fire services. These requirements are especially important in understanding the current public safety delivery system, assessing the costs to the city, and exploring alternatives for the future.

The delivery of emergency medical services (EMS) is handled by the City of Coral Springs Fire Department (CSFD) through a contract. The CSFD employs a nationally utilized two-tier basic and advanced life support model for the delivery of EMS services in communities. CSFD ambulance rescue units staffed with EMTs and paramedics are dispatched to treat and, if needed, transport patients needing basic or advanced medical treatment. Additionally, when needed, a fire engine or ladder truck staffed with EMTs and paramedics may be dispatched to assist by providing quicker response to the patient or additional staffing, in the case of complex medical emergencies. This response model is a standard practice in fire/EMS departments in the U.S.

The 911 emergency dispatch services are provided by the Coral Springs Police Department dispatch center through a contract between the City of Coral Springs and the City of Parkland.



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Crimes such as murder and abduction are handled by the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Other crimes, especially robbery, larceny, assault, auto theft, and vandalism are handled by Parkland Public Safety uniformed officers and two detectives.

This public safety services delivery system in the City of Parkland requires the involvement of six separate entities serving Parkland residents:

1. Coral Springs Police Department for dispatch of Parkland officers;
2. Coral Springs Fire Department for emergency medical services;
3. Broward County Sheriff's Office for heinous offenses;
4. City staff, paid on-call volunteers, and police officers from the Parkland Public Safety Department for fire protection;
5. Parkland Public Safety Department police officers for traffic and most crimes; and,
6. Parkland Public Safety Park Rangers for parks and some patrols.

This public safety services delivery model is not a seamless system. Based on comments from service providers, command and control at complex scenes is clearly an issue.

The Department of Public Safety is open for the public Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. For residents, it is important to understand that the police building is closed to the public after 7:00 p.m. and on weekends. An electronic button at the entrance to the Parkland Department of Public Safety allows a caller to alert the Coral Springs Police Department dispatch, which would then contact an on-duty Parkland public safety employee. If a resident flees to the building at night or on weekends for safety purposes, there may not be anyone present.

Public Safety Department Organizational Structure

The organizational structure within the Parkland Public Safety Department is most unusual in law enforcement and fire administration. The Parkland Public Safety Department structure seems dysfunctional. Personnel stated that they are not sure who



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they report to in the agency. The standard practice in law enforcement agencies serving a population of 20,000+ is to have a second-in-command position. At one point the department had other ranking sworn positions; however, those positions became vacant and were not filled.

Public Safety Budgets

In 1998-1999, the total personnel and operating budget for police services was \$1,472,884; in 2002-2003, the personnel and operating budget was \$2,592,633—a 76 percent increase. Since the public safety department provides both law enforcement and fire services, part of the fire budget has included indirect costs for law enforcement services. This practice is followed by many progressive municipalities in assigning costs to various departments. For example, fleet costs cross municipal department lines in acquisition and maintenance. Excluding grants, the total for police services for 2002/2003 is approximately \$3,317,536 (includes \$475,323 personnel/ operating and \$1,500 for capital outlay from the fire budget).

The percentage of the City of Parkland General Fund for public safety has increased substantially over the past five years. In 1998/1999, the public safety budget was 19.37 percent of the Total General Fund. In 2002/2003, the percentage has increased to 36.99 percent of the Total General Fund.

Per Capita Costs for Police Services

The Study Team was asked about costs of public safety in Parkland relative to the costs in other cities. For FY 2001/2002, the total police-related costs, excluding capital, was approximately \$3,032,480 in the City of Parkland. With an estimated population at the time of 20,000, the per capita costs would have been approximately \$151.62. This includes the published budget data, the indirect costs contained in the fire budget, and the grant funds.



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Based on data from The Municipal Year Book 2002, a publication of the International City/County Management Associations, the average total per capita cost, excluding capital outlay, for police services in 530 cities with a population of 10,000 to 25,000 was \$153.08 in 2001. These data indicate that Parkland is spending an amount similar to other cities its size. Caution is required in the interpretation of comparative data with other cities relative to costs.

Since the fire services are provided by paid police officers, city staff, and paid on-call volunteers, comparative data with municipalities having the same mix are not readily available.

Public Safety Staffing

In July 2003, the Department of Public Safety was staffed with 32 full-time certified police officers, 20 of whom are certified at the basic firefighter level. In addition, there are two-part-time police officers; 25 certified part-time, paid on-call firefighters; four support personnel; and, 20 part-time crossing guards.

After data collection for this study began in July 2003, the director/chief of the Parkland Public Safety Department submitted via a memorandum to the City Manager a request for 10 additional sworn police members. The request was based on the department's research of police employees per 1,000 residents in 12 other cities in the region. One of the 12 cities had a population of 140,000.

Since the justification for 10 more officers (not employees, which includes civilian personnel) was based on the number of employees in other cities, the Study Team reviewed and analyzed crime in those cities. One of the 12 cities, Sea Ranch was excluded since the reported population was 643 total residents. The findings:

- A. In 2002, there were fewer serious crimes (Index Crimes) per sworn member in the City of Parkland than any of the 11 cities with a population of more than 1,000 used by the department in its analysis.



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- B. In 2002, Parkland had a lower crime rate (serious crimes per 1,000 residents) than any of the 11 other cities.

The Study Team has never seen a request by a public safety manager for more officers based on ratios of employees or sworn members in other cities. In the judgment of the Study Team, such justification is without merit and should never be used to determine police employee staffing in a city. In fact, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's Web site contains a caveat about the use of ratios in police staffing.

“Several factors should be considered when comparing agencies according to population. Variables that may impact the practical application of these ratios are: population density, crime rate, service calls per officer, size of jurisdiction, seasonal residents, and tourists.”

Public Safety Attrition

Attrition relates to the number of sworn personnel or employees leaving an agency. Between 1998 and 2002, the Parkland Department of Public Safety experienced the highest attrition rate of any paid public safety, police, or fire department assessed by or known to the Study Team. During that five-year period, 43 sworn members resigned. The average attrition by year over the five-year period was approximately 30 percent, six times the typical attrition rate in other law enforcement agencies observed by the Study Team. (The data were extracted from materials provided by the department.)

An assessment of the reported data on 43 resignations indicates that 32 of the 43 who resigned from Parkland went to other law enforcement agencies; one (1) of the 43 became a firefighter. Of particular importance, 17 of the 43 had less than one year of service with the Parkland Public Safety Department.

The impacts of this high attrition of sworn personnel seem to result in:



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- Enormous costs to taxpayers in the City of Parkland (the costs include the absence of personnel to deploy in patrol);
- Instability in the Parkland public safety workforce (constant turnover);
- Parkland serving as a ‘training ground’ for other law enforcement agencies;
- Some inexperienced personnel responding to crime and other safety calls in Parkland; and,
- Major liability exposure in the City of Parkland (as noted in this report, probationary officers have served as ‘Officers-in-Charge (OIC),’ a most unusual and atypical approach in police or fire management.

In any police agency, employees may leave for a variety of reasons, including mutual understanding that the employee isn’t measuring up. Since so many sworn went to other police agencies, it seems that Parkland lost some very good officers.

Prior to completing this work, the Study Team was told that there has been no attrition among sworn personnel for the eight months of January 1, 2003 and August 31, 2003. Unless there are problem officers, the lack of attrition for this period seems to be good news for the department and its stakeholders.

In interviews with members of the Parkland Public Safety Department, there were divergent views about the reason for the attrition rate. Three primary reasons mentioned by senior personnel: 1) the lack of a Defined Pension Plan; 2) the lack of a personally assigned vehicle program; and, 3) the requirement to provide both police and fire services. A city official noted that exit interviews indicated that the lack of a ‘Defined Pension Plan’ was the reason most frequently noted by those officers leaving the department.

A number of less experienced members stated that the lack of upward mobility, the low volume of workload, the requirements to be a firefighter, the ease to get hired and certified by Parkland for other police agencies, and the lack of specialization available in Parkland were reasons for the attrition. For example, the Study Team was told by members that they and other officers had applied to multiple police departments;



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however, Parkland hired them first. There were also references to differing employment requirements in some agencies.

The attrition has resulted in a cadre of personnel with limited experience in 2003. For instance, sixteen (16) of the 26 non-supervisory sworn personnel have less than two years of public safety experience with the City of Parkland. Reportedly, a number of these personnel were in police and fire training for almost a year, leaving less than one year of patrol service for Parkland. Of the 10 non-supervisory personnel with more than two years of service, two are in schools and not regularly assigned to patrol services; this leaves eight personnel with two or more years of service for patrol. Of the eight non-supervisory sworn personnel for patrol, only five have four years or more of experience in Parkland.

Personally-Assigned Vehicles (PAV)

A number of sworn members of the Parkland Public Safety Department stated that they needed a take-home car program, also called PAV, to be competitive with other police agencies. While there are benefits to employees to have free transportation to and from work, the Study Team believes there are limited benefits to stakeholders for take-home cars in cities that don't have residency requirements. A police car parked on a street can be a deterrent to crime. In county-wide law enforcement agencies, take-home car programs are pervasive. As to the relationship of attrition, the Study Team was told that school resource officers (SROs) have take home cars, but, reportedly, there has been attrition among SROs.

If the City of Parkland maintains its own police department, the Study Team does not recommend a PAV program for public safety operations. There may be other reasons.

Perceptions of Public Safety in Parkland - Customer Input

The Study Team had the opportunity to interview people who live in Parkland; these persons who gave their personal time are stakeholders. These stakeholders included



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persons specifically requested by the Study Team: chairpersons or presidents of civic/community committees, school officials, city board members, and personnel who have raised issues regarding safety in the City of Parkland.

During the course of the interviews, the Study Team outlined to each person the background regarding the purpose of the public safety assessment and the importance of gaining citizen input on public safety services and concerns. Each person was told that their comments would not be specifically identified.

It was quite apparent to the Study Team that the participants appreciated the opportunity to provide input on the study process. The following are a representative number of comments and salient points expressed by the customers interviewed.

1. I lived here 10 years and did not know that the Public Safety Department was closed at night and weekends until I needed them.
2. We can't see officers in cars because of the dark tinted windows; someone said why didn't you wave to me; I said, I couldn't see you.
3. I did not know that Coral Springs handled the 911 dispatch calls.
4. Police seem to be friendly.
5. Sometimes, the response time is very slow.
6. When I observed responses to a fire call, a police car showed up fairly soon; but it was some time before a fire truck (engine) arrived.
7. It took 20 minutes for the department to respond to an alarm at my house.
8. Police like to park in bushes to work radar.
9. We have pedestrian safety issues.
10. I'm not sure what crime and safety problems we have.
11. I feel very safe in this community.
12. The primary problems in this city are: more kids on bikes, more kids on skateboards, and traffic risks.
13. I like the SRO program in our schools.
14. We need strong leadership.
15. EMS needs to be a priority.



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16. Why not consider the Broward Sheriff's Department to serve us.
17. We don't have good fire protection.
18. I didn't know that there were changes in fire training requirements.
19. There is not much crime in the city, just silly things like speeding.
20. I did not know our police and fire services were provided by the same Parkland employees.

Perceptions in Parkland - Public Safety Employee Input

The Study Team interviewed sworn and civilian members of the department relative to their perceptions of public safety practices and programs. While it is not unusual to receive negative comments in such studies, the comments from some members of the department point to a critical need for significant changes in the way the public safety services are provided in Parkland, and the way the department conducts business. The Study Team refers to comments as 'opportunities for improvement' in and 'strengths' of the department.

Opportunities for Improvement

In addition to a defined pension plan and a personally-assigned vehicle plan, members noted the following:

1. The policy manual needs updating and now.
2. We have no records manual.
3. This department needs supervision.
4. I'm not sure who I work for in this department.
5. We need our own dispatch.
6. We need a structure (building); there is a contract to build a new building.
7. No police supervisor has firefighter II certification; yet, they supervise fire scenes.
8. Sometimes contract people responding to a fire don't have the capability to open gates (in gated communities).



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9. The attrition here is unbelievable; very costly to city.
10. We need to reduce turnover.
11. Some people here would not have been hired by another agency.
12. This agency has a problem defining itself.
13. We see Law Enforcement Explorers' photos everywhere in this department; but we don't see photos of police officers doing their job.
14. We need a better commendation/awards program.
15. We don't need a fire station near City Hall, wrong place.
16. We need separate police and fire departments.
17. We've lost 1/3rd of our people every year.
18. Probationary officers with less than one year and no supervisory experience have served as OICs (officers in charge); a very bad practice.
19. We don't have a crime scene unit; BSO worked last murder we had.
20. We need civilians for crime scene technicians and accident investigations.
21. There is no breathalyzer here; we have to go either to Fort Lauderdale or a regional location; we don't go to Coral Springs since we don't get along: It's sad, truly sad.
22. Senior people here want a city pension plan; and they don't want to wait six years for a state or BSO plan; that's driving their motivation.
23. We have a majority of young people who want to go to BSO.
24. We've had problems internally with working with Coral Springs. Some of our people said, "S.... them." It was bad.
25. We need staffed fire apparatus that can respond to fire calls with trained and dedicated firefighters and officers.
26. We need to take care of our senior personnel.

Strengths of the Department

A representative number of comments by employees that represent 'positives' or 'strengths' of the department include:



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1. It's a small department.
2. I can get shifts I want.
3. We get time off when we want it.
4. I like the community.
5. The people in the community are very good.
6. Dispatch (Coral Springs) is very good.
7. There is potential here for various jobs, such as both police and fire.
8. I'd like to see Parkland keep fire.
9. A lot of police departments in the area won't hire applicants without experience or B.S. degree, but Parkland will hire these applicants.
10. I applied to several police departments, but Parkland hired me right away.
11. I like being an SRO;
12. We can get certified here and be more marketable.

Crime in Parkland

Police agencies in Florida and other states provide monthly reports to state agencies regarding serious crime. These crimes are called Index Crimes: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The first four are referred to as violent crimes and the latter three are property crimes. In 2002, there were 348 Index Crimes; in 2002, there were 362 reported Index Crimes in Parkland. Approximately four percent of Index Crimes in Parkland are violent crimes. In 2002, 13 of the 14 violent crimes were assaults. Approximately 96 percent of Index Crimes in Parkland are property crimes. In 2002, the department reported 243 larcenies, 89 burglaries, and 16 motor vehicle thefts: a total of 348 property crimes.

On a very positive note, the City of Parkland has a very low crime rate for Index Crime in comparison with other cities of similar size in Florida and in the U.S. In the judgment of the Study Team, the low crime rate in Parkland is not directly related to the staffing in the Parkland Public Safety Department. The low crime rate seems related to the demographics, large number of residents living in gated communities, limited access by



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roads, and the lack of certain businesses/industries that represent potential for certain crimes (bars and dance clubs, for example).

Police Efficiency (Clearance Rates)

The only national indicator of police efficiency in quantitative terms is a police department's clearance rates for Index Crimes. In simple terms, clearance rates relate to the effectiveness of a police department in solving crime, or catching crooks.

In 2001, the Parkland Public Safety Department reported a 2.3 percent clearance rate (solution) for serious crime. This 2.3 percent clearance rate is the lowest ever observed by the Study Team in the U.S. In 2002, the clearance rate was 10.8 percent, still very low in comparison with cities of all sizes. Based on discussions with department personnel, there seems to be some lack of knowledge about UCR clearance rates, lack of formal training for this important function, and an apparent lack of knowledge about calculations of the data by a management employee.

As a contrast, the clearance rates in 2002 for several municipalities:

- | | | |
|----|--|------------|
| 1. | The Broward County Sheriff's Office in 2002: | 50 Percent |
| 2. | North Lauderdale (contract with BSO) | 48 Percent |
| 3. | Lauderdale-by-the-Sea (contract with BSO) | 50 Percent |

Translated, the data indicate that the likelihood of a serious crime being solved by the Parkland Public Safety Department is very low in comparison with other police agencies.

Calls for Service (A key workload indicator)

Calls for service information is typically used by police agencies in determining staffing levels, deployment of patrol personnel, establishing patrol boundaries, revising patrol boundaries, and other operational and administrative uses.



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The department reported data to the Study Team in two different formats. One format for total calls for service related to resident-initiated calls and officer-initiated calls. This is the preferred way of reporting calls for service. For resident-initiated calls, the data indicate that the number of calls increased from 6,743 in 1998 to 9,467 in 2002. The number of officer-initiated calls increased from 1,108 in 1998 to 2,187 in 2002.

In assessing police patrol staffing requirements, the number of calls by hour, day of week, and month are important data. In this format, the department notes that calls include radio transmissions. In this format, the number of calls for 2002 is 19,658 calls (8,004 more calls than reported above). These data are of little value in determining the police staffing requirements for the City of Parkland. Typically, reported data on calls for service by hour of day relate to citizen requests for service.

Arrests

The number of adult arrests has been fairly consistent over the past five years. In 2002, there were fewer adult arrests (144) than in 1998 (149). The number of juvenile arrests increased from 42 in 1998 to 144 in 2002. These arrests relate to all offenses.

Motor Vehicle Accidents & Traffic Citations

The number of motor vehicle accidents has been very similar each year over a five-year period. In 1998, there were 133 reported crashes and 139 in 2002. The number of traffic citations, however, has more than doubled in five years. In 1998, there were 2,065 traffic citations; in 2002, there were 4,426 traffic citations.

It should be pointed out that there is no indication of a positive correlation between motor vehicle crashes and the number of traffic citations in Parkland, a finding that is similar to other assessments by the Study Team of traffic enforcement in the U.S. The City should require an assessment of traffic enforcement practices by the department.



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Parkland Police Patrol Practices

The patrol services in Parkland are incorporated into the public safety model. Three sergeants, one assigned to each shift, manage the patrol operations. Each of the sergeants reports organizationally to the chief/director. One sergeant works permanent midnight shifts. This sergeant's days off are Sunday and Monday.

Patrol personnel are assigned to three or four zones. According to officials, the department assigns a minimum of four personnel to patrol most of the time; however, after 3:00 a.m., three members are utilized on occasion to staff patrol services. The staffing of three or four includes a sergeant or OIC.

Police Supervision and OIC Practices in Parkland

In addition to the three sergeants, the department's roster of sworn personnel indicate three positions of Officer in Charge (OIC). A number of personnel referred to these positions as corporals; yet, there is no classification of corporal. OIC personnel have 'corporal' bars on their collars. The OIC is to be in charge when a sergeant is not working. With days off, vacations, sick leave, and training time, there have been times when both the sergeant and OIC are not working.

While the number of times a probationary officer reportedly served as OIC in Parkland may have been very limited, any assignment of a probationary officer in this way is very difficult to understand. It is a very serious problem, and it should be stopped.

If the city maintains an institutional police department, the following patrol recommendations should be considered.

- A. Request the police department to provide a written assessment of patrol beats on an annual basis.
- B. Limit, at this time, take-home cars to the chief of police position, criminal investigations positions, and police supervisors.



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- C. Require a monthly report on the frequency of call-outs for any and all employees of the Parkland Police Department.
- D. Assure that a 'trained' police supervisor is on duty at all times, even if it means the chief/director works nights and weekends.
- E. Incorporate Community Policing into the basic job of a police officer (needs to be a written plan).
- F. Require the Parkland Police Department to meet all accreditation standards on patrol operation by 2005, with monthly progress reports from the Chief of Police to the City Manager.

Criminal Investigations

Two sworn members are assigned to criminal investigations. The structure of criminal investigations in Parkland seems unusual. For example, the organizational structure notes that detectives report to three sergeants. Officials noted that the day sergeant is generally regarded as the supervisor since detectives work primarily during the day. The organizational structure does not relate to the quality of the detectives, there is no position of second in command. If the City retains its own police department, or fire department, a revised organizational structure with an appropriate rank structure should be implemented.

Reportedly, serious crimes, such as murder or abductions, would be handled by the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO). Staff noted that the last homicide in Parkland was investigated by the BSO.

Detectives in Parkland typically work Monday through Friday during the day. If a detective is required at night or on weekends, an off-duty detective will respond. When asked the reason why detectives are not assigned to evening shifts and Saturdays, the reasons are unclear. The Study Team typically recommends that detectives in all police agencies work evening hours and Saturdays to meet with victims and investigate crimes, since some crime occurs during the hours of darkness and on weekends.



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Personnel report that there is no formalized case management system for criminal investigations. Modern law enforcement agencies utilize formalized case management.

Reportedly, there is no formalized crime analysis program by the Parkland Public Safety Department to provide patrol officers and residents timely information about crime trends and suspects. Crime analysis is a fundamental task in modern law enforcement and a necessity to form partnerships with residents in preventing and solving crime.

If the City of Parkland maintains its own police department, the following recommendations are suggested for criminal investigations:

- A. Assure that the Parkland Police Department meets all the Florida or national accreditation standards for criminal investigations.
- B. Assign experienced patrol officers to conduct investigations of some criminal offenses.
- C. Require automation of case management for criminal investigations.
- D. Provide the City Manager's Office monthly summary reports, quarterly reports, and annual reports on all crime and workload data, to include clearance rates for Index Crime.
- E. Require that future police-related budget requests be connected to meeting specific performance measurements and accountability processes in criminal investigations.
- F. Assign investigative personnel to evening and Saturday schedules.
- G. Fund any additional systems requirements to maximize the processing, storing, accessing, and distribution of crime analysis information, and participate in the Broward County Sheriff's Office "POWERTRAC" crime analysis system regardless of the future policing model.
- H. Update all policies and written protocols relative to the investigations of serious crime in the City of Parkland and evaluate staffing requirements annually.



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Police Policy Manual

One of the key indicators of the organizational health of a police department is the state of its written directives system. With police organizations, policies, procedures, and programs need to be clearly understood by the service providers. The Study Team was told that the Parkland policy manual was being updated during the Study Period; a copy was provided to the Study Team. The Table of Contents notes that it was revised 01/01/03. Several observations:

1. The Internal Investigations policy, the policy that relates to the investigation of citizen complaints, is dated 1989. The citizen complaint form in this policy has the name of a former public safety director, an old address for the Public Safety Department, and an old telephone number.
2. Most of the policies do not have a signature of a chief or director.
3. A number of the directives/policies refer to a Bureau Commander; however, there are no such positions at this time.
4. Policy 17A notes that all evidence, contraband, or stolen property will be turned into the Evidence Supervisor. The 2002-2003 organizational structure does not contain a property/evidence function, a typical designation in police organizational structures.
5. Section 41A, Rules of Conduct, has no signature, no date, and refers to the rank of captain, which does not exist.

The Manual does contain some good policies. With respect to Emergency Preparedness, the Parkland manual contains the Broward Sheriff's Office, "Condition Red/Severe Response Outline," with a message from the Sheriff. This section also contains an insert from the Palm Beach County, Countywide Anti-Terrorism Committee; this section refers to "Red Alert Response Procedures."

If the City of Parkland maintains an institutional police department, the recommendations:



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- A. Update the Policy and Procedures Manual;
- B. Revisit the numbering system;
- C. Connect the table of contents with all the policies;
- D. Assure that there is a clear code of conduct; and,
- E. Train all personnel on the new manual.

Accreditation

The Parkland Public Safety Department is not an accredited agency. Law enforcement accreditation began in the early 1980s. Accreditation is a concept, a process and a status. In simple terms, "to accredit" means to recognize or vouch for an agency as conforming to a body of standards related to a specific discipline--in this instance law enforcement.

One wouldn't think of going to a college or hospital that is not accredited. In state and federal courts, the lack of accreditation by the affected police department has been raised by plaintiffs' attorneys.

In the State of Florida, there are two avenues to become an accredited police department: the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies, formed in 1979, or the Commission on Florida Accreditation.

Within Florida, there are 71 law enforcement agencies that are accredited or recognized as accredited by CALEA. In the Parkland area, the law enforcement agencies include the Coral Springs Police Department, the Margate Police Department, the Florida Highway Patrol, and the Broward County Sheriff's Office.

Community Policing/Crime Prevention

The Study Team asked members of the Parkland Public Safety Department about a written plan on community policing. Ostensibly, there is no written plan within the department that outlines Community Policing in Parkland. The reasons may relate to the



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dual tasks of policing and firefighting in the past. If there is a plan, knowledge of the plan is sparse.

The department does provide various programs on crime prevention and safety. School officials were especially complimentary of some activities of the School Resource Officers.

For the future, the Study Team is suggesting a holistic approach to community policing in the City of Parkland and incorporating park rangers, which is a good program in Parkland.

Regardless of the policing option, the community policing recommendations include:

- A. Develop or have presented a comprehensive plan on Community Policing in Parkland. The plan should relate to a holistic approach to policing and should include extensive stakeholder involvement, focus on trails, park ranger participation, partnerships with residents, timely notification of residents on incipient or existential crime patterns, and participation by other city agencies/personnel;
- B. Conduct Community Policing Training that involves patrol officers, detectives, residents, community groups, schools, park rangers, and personnel from other city agencies.

Fire Protection Services

Fire protection services are provided to Parkland by the Fire Operations Division of the Department of Public Safety. The 45 personnel providing firefighting services include public safety officers, who also provide police services, and part-time paid on call firefighters—21 firefighters and four lieutenants.

Parkland fire apparatus are housed at two fire stations/sheds. A third fire station is under consideration for future implementation in the western part of the city. Regardless of the



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future provider of fire protection services, the City of Parkland will have to improve fire facilities.

Currently, when a fire call is dispatched, the on-duty police respond to the scene in their patrol vehicles, don protective clothing and, on occasions, wait for the fire apparatus to be brought to the scene in order to initiate suppression service. In the judgment of the Study Team, Parkland has grown too large and has too many public safety needs to utilize this model for fire protection services. Moreover, the delivery of fire protection and suppression services goes hand in hand with the delivery of emergency medical services.

The current fire protection system also results in barriers and other obstacles to implementing important suppression tasks that typically require a concerted team effort.

The Parkland Public Safety Department lacks fully qualified and experienced command officers to perform the important function of incident command on fire emergencies. Further, there are times when fire incidents take place and there is no fire officer responding due to scheduling issues. Typically, fire operations are commanded by experienced and tenured chief officers at the rank of battalion chief or higher.

Currently, new Parkland Public Safety Department personnel are trained to the Firefighter II level by the Coral Springs Fire Department training staff. The in-service training program provided by Parkland's fire operations division is organized by two part-time fire lieutenants and consists of six drills per month on different fire topics. Parkland fire personnel must attend at least one in-service fire drill per month.

The Parkland Public Safety Procedures Manual includes a limited number of fire-related procedures and a number of the procedures in place are of limited scope. If the city chooses to implement a Parkland Fire Department option, extensive efforts need to be initiated to develop and implement a comprehensive policies and procedures manual that address essential organizational, operations, safety, and training topics.



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The future fire protection services will require analysis of response times and automatic mutual aid. Currently, the response time data seem skewed due to the practice of showing response times to fires that relate to a police officer arriving in a car, rather than a fire engine.

The following recommendations are suggested to improve fire protection in Parkland, regardless of whether the fire service delivery option is institutional (new department) or a contract model:

- A. Adopt a deployment strategy for fire service delivery that includes the immediate response of an engine and aerial truck staffed with fully qualified and trained paid staff;
- B. Staff Parkland fire units (engine and aerial truck) with a minimum of three full-time paid firefighters and officers;
- C. Continue the paid on-call approach to providing supplemental firefighter staffing of the Parkland fire service;
- D. Monitor and assess fire incident and response time data to determine opportunities for improvement in the deployment strategy;
- E. Implement automatic mutual aid agreements and deployment strategies with other appropriate municipal/county fire agencies and pursue a “closest unit dispatched” approach to fire service delivery;
- F. Consider a change in the color of Parkland fire apparatus to enhance visibility for safety purposes;
- G. Adopt a more traditional/typical fire apparatus staffing and deployment strategy on fire incidents;
- H. Implement and fully utilize a comprehensive incident command system;
- I. Provide fire command staffing on fire incidents at the battalion chief or above chief officer level;
- J. Develop and implement a comprehensive fire service-related policy and procedures manual;
- K. Initiate action to appropriately upgrade the Parkland fire facilities, including upgrading/replacing Fire Station 42 on Parkside Drive,



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completing the new public safety center with fire facilities on N. University, and implementing a fire station facility in the vicinity of Trails End and Nob Hill or Pine Island roads.

Emergency Medical Services (EMS)

EMS service delivery in Parkland has been provided under contract with the City of Coral Springs Fire Department (CSFD) since 1996. The CSFD operates four ALS rescue units and provides EMS patient care services to Parkland with these units. The Parkland/Coral Springs contract calls for monitoring and assessment of rescue unit response times on EMS calls. Although not provided in the contract, the CSFD has recently been basing a rescue unit on Parkside Drive in Parkland to reduce response times, apparently based on the assessment of response times on EMS calls in Parkland.

The provision of Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) services and availability of automatic external defibrillators for use on EMS patients by public safety service providers are two state-of-the-art EMS-related service enhancements that should continue to be provided as part of the EMS service delivery approach in Parkland. Likewise, EMS billing for patient transport and care on calls is used nationally as an approach to offset the high costs of EMS service delivery and should be continued in Parkland in the future.

Options for future EMS service delivery for Parkland include a new Parkland Fire and Rescue Department, Broward County Fire and Rescue, continuing with the Coral Springs Fire Department, or the Margate Fire Department.

The following recommendations are intended to improve EMS services in Parkland, regardless of the fire/EMS service delivery option selected by the city.

- A. Deliver EMS services in Parkland with one rescue unit located centrally at Fire Station 97, at the N. University public safety facility, in the city;
- B. Staff the Parkland EMS rescue unit with three (3) firefighter/EMTs and paramedics;



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- C. Monitor and assess EMS response time data to determine opportunities for improvement in deployment strategy;
- D. Implement automatic mutual aid and deployment strategies with other appropriate municipal/county EMS agencies, and pursue a “closest unit dispatched” approach to EMS delivery;
- E. Develop comprehensive EMS policies and procedures as part of a manual;
- F. Continue the policy of billing for EMS calls in Parkland.

Emergency Dispatch & Records

The Coral Springs Police Department (CSPD) has provided emergency dispatch services to Parkland public safety and local government units since November 1993. On balance, the remarks about the quality of work were very positive.

The Study Team was advised by CSPD dispatch officials that a communications and dispatch system upgrade is just being completed which provides further enhancements to the CSPD dispatch center. Reportedly, this upgrade included new ergonomic dispatch furniture consoles and two phases of equipment upgrades to include improved technology for AVL and GIS-based mapping. The Study Team noted that the technological support provided as part of the CSPD dispatch process is very impressive.

The Margate Police Department (MPD) and the Broward County Sheriff’s Office also operate very good emergency dispatch systems. Observations of the systems indicate state-of-the-art dispatch systems.

For public safety records, the Parkland Public Safety Department has three positions of administrative assistant. One provides clerical support for the position of chief of police and also provides some records support. The other two personnel handle the records management process.

It should be pointed out that the Parkland Public Safety Department is open until 7:00 p.m during the week. Most police records functions close at 5:00 p.m. In this function,



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the department is to be complimented for adjusting hours of work to meet the public's needs.

The following are recommendations relative to qualitative and responsive emergency dispatch and records services in Parkland, regardless of the public safety option selected by the city.

- A. Assure that Parkland public safety customers are served by a state-of-the-art emergency dispatch system, including CAD, E 911 and related systems;
- B. Maintain and enhance the use of a state-of-the-art radio system, preferably an 800MHz trunking system;
- C. Ensure that the dispatch staff serving Parkland are provided with a comprehensive training program that meets or exceeds state and national standards, principles, and practices;
- D. Continue with and enhance the Emergency Medical Dispatch function and related quality assurance services provided by the dispatchers serving Parkland;
- E. Ensure that the Parkland emergency dispatch function is located in and supported by a state-of-the-art dispatch facility;
- F. Require monthly response time data from any emergency dispatch services provider relative to fires, crimes, medical emergencies, and other services;
- G. Assure that any public safety services agency, institutional or contract, meets all accreditation standards relative to emergency dispatch and records through either the Florida Commission on Accreditation or the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies.

Seamless Public Safety Services

In the experiences of the Study Team as practitioners in fire/EMS and law enforcement, and public safety consultants in more than 40 states, there are major benefits to having centralized public safety services. When a motor vehicle accident occurs, there is often the need to have law enforcement to investigate the accident, fire apparatus to extinguish



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a fire, and an ambulance to transport patients. The emergency communications services is the nerve center for command and control in the delivery of public safety services and the safety of service providers and patients/victims.

When the initial 911 emergency request is received by a public safety agency, the caller/victim/patient is not concerned about the insignia or name on an emergency vehicle; they expect timely and responsive service by certified emergency service providers.

Seamless public safety services in the immediate area include:

1. The City of Coral Springs has a seamless public safety delivery system. The city has its own fire/EMS, law enforcement, and emergency dispatch functions. One government official is in charge, the City Manager.
2. The City of Margate has a seamless public safety delivery system. Margate has its own police, fire/EMS, and dispatch functions. One government official is in charge, the City Manager.
3. The Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) has a seamless public safety delivery system. One official is in charge: the Sheriff.

There are various views regarding seamless delivery of public safety services. The discussion above provides one view of seamless public safety service delivery that relates to all services—police, fire, EMS, and dispatch—being provided by the same municipality (e.g., Parkland, Coral Springs, or Margate) or agency (e.g. the BSO). Another view of seamless public safety service delivery, which is more frequently found in the fire and EMS services, relates to two or more municipalities providing their fire and/or EMS services in a consolidated manner.

This consolidated approach to seamless fire and/or EMS services may be attained through automatic mutual aid, mutual planning of resource locations—fire stations and apparatus—to avoid costly duplication, technological interfacing of CAD and related systems to facilitate automatic mutual aid, etc., and through consolidation/regionalization



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implemented by municipalities and the county. Of course, assuming good management and resource utilization, the broader the geographic implementation of automatic mutual aid, joint resource planning, and/or regionalization, the more cost savings and service delivery improvements may be realized by the taxpayer and the recipient of the public safety services.

This second view of seamless services delivery should also be considered as part of this Parkland decision process.

Public Safety Models & Options

The Study Team explored a variety of models and options for law enforcement, fire protection services, emergency medical services, and emergency dispatch. The models were developed after conducting an assessment of the current and future public safety needs in Parkland, and conducting a detailed analysis of the current public safety operations, management, support systems, and services at this time. The City of Parkland should assess internally its public safety needs each year and make any necessary adjustments.

At the outset, it is important to note that Parkland has some very good employees in public safety, paid and volunteer. The “can do” attitude by some personnel is outstanding.

The current model of having police officers provide both police and fire services on a long-range basis is not one of the options being set forth by the Study Team. This decision is based, in part, on the Study Team’s assessment of workload, attrition, Florida State requirements for firefighters, costs, and the tremendous training requirements for an employee to deliver both police and fire services. The Study Team considered an option wherein a neighboring city would provide law enforcement services; however, that option seems to have too many barriers, too cumbersome to implement, and has limited application in the region. Therefore, for the delivery of law enforcement services, there appear to be only two viable options for the City of Parkland to implement.



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- A. Establish a Parkland Police Department for law enforcement services;
- B. Contract with the Broward County Sheriff's Office for law enforcement services.

For the delivery of fire protection and emergency medical services, there are four options:

- A. Establish a Parkland Fire and Rescue Department for fire and EMS services;
- B. Contract with Broward County Sheriff's Office for fire and EMS services;
- C. Contract with the City of Coral Springs for fire and continuation of EMS services; and,
- D. Contract with the City of Margate for fire and EMS services.

For the delivery of police, fire and EMS emergency dispatch services, there appear to be four options available to the City of Parkland for the future provision of law enforcement, fire and EMS emergency communications and dispatch services to residents and business owners of Parkland:

- A. Establish a new Parkland 911 Emergency Communications Center;
- B. Contract with Broward County Sheriff's Office for 911 communications and dispatch services;
- C. Continue to contract with the City of Coral Springs for 911 communications and dispatch services; or,
- D. Contract with the City of Margate for 911 communications and dispatch services.

During the Study Period, city officials requested the Study Team to submit the public safety models to potential service providers. Hence, a letter was sent to the Broward County Sheriff's Office requesting a letter of interest in and a proposal for providing law enforcement services, fire protection, emergency medical services, and emergency dispatch.



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Letters were sent to the City Manager in Coral Springs and the City Manager in Margate relative to their interest in and a proposal for providing services for fire protection, emergency medical services, and emergency dispatch.

Proposals for Public Safety Services

On August 28, 2003, CBI received the following proposals:

- A. A proposal from the Broward County Sheriff's Office to provide law enforcement services, fire protection services, emergency medical services, and emergency dispatch services.
- B. A proposal from the Coral Springs Fire Department to provide fire protection services, emergency medical services, and emergency dispatch services.
- C. A proposal from the City Manager and Fire Chief of Margate in a letter form to provide fire protection services, emergency medical services, and emergency dispatch services.

The proposals from the BSO and the CSFD noted that current public safety employees in the City of Parkland would be offered positions within the respective agencies. The CSFD included a reference that the proposed cost related to the salaries and benefits of CSFD employees; therefore, the final costs to Parkland would relate, in part, to the differences in salaries and benefits of Parkland employees. Moreover, the CSFD proposal contained a provision that indicated a six-year contract with a two-year termination clause.

The proposal from the Broward County Sheriff's Office covered the baseline criteria for all four emergency services. The letter from Margate included statements about their interest in working with Parkland officials to discuss in detail the level of services that were estimated in a cost range.



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Proposed Contract Costs and Parkland Institutional Models

The following is a summary of costs, in alphabetical order, from the proposers and costs of the institutional (in-house) option. The institution costs were determined by the Study Team, based on current fiscal data from the Finance Department. Before the selection of any option, the City is encouraged to verify costs, staffing, services, and acceptance of current employees by any contractor.

Fire & EMS

None of the fire/EMS costs includes construction of new facilities or renovations of current facilities. The costs do include use of existing fire apparatus and the planned acquisition by Parkland of a quint ladder truck, a piece of fire apparatus with multiple functions.

Broward Sheriff's Office.....	\$4,259,000
Includes Dispatch	
Coral Springs Fire Department.....	\$2,944,233
Includes Dispatch	
Excludes any Salary Cost Differences of Parkland's Personnel	
Excludes Level of Supervision in Proposed Fire/EMS Models	
Excludes Cost Reimbursement of EMS Billing to Parkland	
City of Margate.....	\$3,800,000-\$4,200,000
Includes Dispatch	
Includes Interests in Negotiating Costs/Services	
Excludes Specifics on Criteria in Model	
Parkland Fire/EMS Model.....	\$4,293,614
Excludes Dispatch	
Includes Two Trailers (Interim)	



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Law Enforcement

Broward Sheriff's Office \$3,237,000

Includes Dispatch

Includes all Criteria in Proposed Model

Costs are lower than the current Parkland Police costs

Parkland Police Department (29 Sworn & 5 Civilian) \$4,186,187

Includes:

PAV \$306,046

Defined Pension \$144,802

City Indirect \$175,000

Cost for Attrition—three sworn \$162,627

Cost for Accreditation First Year \$200,000 (internal)

Total \$988,475

Excluding above (\$988,475), CBI Estimates \$3,197,712

2003 Estimated Parkland Police budget \$3,317,536

Including 10 Additional Sworn \$5,156,279

(Request by Department July 2003)

The \$970,092 necessary to fulfill this staffing request from the director includes Salaries, PAV and Defined Pension.

Excludes Parkland Dispatch

Dispatch

Broward County Sheriff's Office

Absorbed Fire/EMS/Police

Coral Springs Fire Department

Absorbed Fire/EMS

City of Margate

Absorbed Fire/EMS

Parkland Dispatch Model

\$3,404,800



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Cost Summary

<u>Service Provider(s)</u>	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Seamless</u>
<u>Parkland</u>		
● Police Department, Fire/EMS Department, Dispatch	\$11,332,571	Yes
<u>Broward Sheriff's Office</u>		
● Police, Fire/EMS, Dispatch	\$7,496,000	Yes
<u>City of Coral Springs</u>		
● Fire/EMS/Dispatch & Parkland PD*	\$7,130,420	No
<u>City of Margate</u>		
● Fire/EMS/Dispatch & Parkland PD (Min.)**	\$7,986,187	No
<u>Combined Broward Sheriff's Office</u>		
● Police/dispatch (\$3,237,000) &		
<u>Coral Springs</u>		
● Fire/EMS* (\$2,944,233)	\$6,181,233	No

*Proposal does not meet all criteria in model. Will require clarification.

**Proposal lacks response to the specific criteria, but clear indication of willingness to negotiate price and services.

Parkland is currently paying the City of Coral Springs on an annual basis approximately \$354,000 for emergency medical services and \$30,000 for emergency dispatch services.

For law enforcement services, the BSO proposal is approximately \$80,000 less than the 2003 Parkland police department estimated costs. The Study Team's proposal, without a PAV, defined pension plan, accreditation costs, and city indirect, is approximately \$39,999 lower than the BSO proposal and \$119,824 lower than the City of Parkland's 2003/04 estimated police budget. However, BSO's proposal is from an accredited law enforcement agency and it would provide the PAV for all Parkland Public Safety Department sworn employees who transition to BSO and who could remain in Parkland.

Impact of Costs



Carroll Buracker & Associates, Inc.

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In light of the costs for institutional departments or contract services, one might question the anticipated increased in costs for public safety services in the City of Parkland. However, it should be pointed out that the City of Parkland is on the threshold of major decisions about the delivery of public safety. While there have been few incidents relative to lack of public safety services, in the judgment of the Study Team, the City of Parkland has been very fortunate in avoiding tragedy and major liability costs. The current public safety system is broken and it needs to be fixed before someone is seriously hurt or worse.

Notwithstanding the attrition from 1998-2002, there are other concerns. The City of Parkland is growing. This growth will place new demands on public safety services delivery in the future.

As noted in this report in several sections, the City of Parkland now has very distinct options in selecting an alternative to the current public safety model.

Customer Comments from Contract Services

The Study Team interviewed officials in other cities for views on public safety services by the Broward County Sheriff's Office and reviewed prior written letters from city officials to the Sheriff of Broward County. Without exception, all city officials expressed considerable pride in the quality of the law enforcement and dispatch services and the lower overall costs had they provided similar services.

In the contracts with Coral Springs, most of the reports relative to emergency medical services (EMS) and dispatch were very favorable. There was some grumbling by employees in the Parkland Public Safety Department about the poor relations with Coral Springs. According to some employees, the friction relates to a recent election.

In contacts with Coconut Creek officials relative to the services by the Margate Fire Department, all the comments were favorable.



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Study Team's Suggested Seamless Model

For a seamless public safety delivery system, Parkland has two apparent options. Parkland can develop its own police department, fire/EMS department, and emergency dispatch system; the estimated cost is more than \$11.3 million. A second option is to contract with the BSO for all three services at a cost of approximately \$7.4 million.

Of course, if the interest is in the most economical model, there are other options. For example, if the City of Parkland elects to have its own institutional police department, either Broward County, Margate, or Coral Springs would be excellent choices for fire/EMS and dispatch.

1. Law Enforcement Services

While either option could serve the City of Parkland, the Study Team makes its recommendation after evaluating the potential advantages and disadvantages of the two options for the delivery of law enforcement services, feedback from contract customers receiving services from BSO, and the costs.

The City of Parkland is encouraged to consider a Law Enforcement Service Agreement with the Broward Sheriff's Office for the delivery of all law enforcement services in the City of Parkland.

2. Fire Protection and Emergency Medical Services

While either of the four options could provide excellent services to the City of Parkland, the Study Team makes its recommendation after evaluating the potential advantages and disadvantages, feedback from contract customers receiving services from BSO, and the costs.

The City of Parkland is encouraged to enter into a Fire Protection and Emergency Medical Services Agreement with the Broward Sheriff's Office. The primary



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reason for suggesting this option relates to a “Seamless Public Safety Services” model if the City selects BSO for law enforcement. If the City of Parkland elects to have its own institutional police department, either Broward County, Margate, or Coral Springs would be excellent choices for fire/EMS.

3. Emergency 911 Communications and Dispatch

While either option outlined in this report should provide excellent services, the Study Team makes its recommendation after evaluating the potential advantages and disadvantages of the four options, feedback from contract customers receiving services from BSO, and the costs.

The City of Parkland is encouraged to enter into a 911 Emergency Communications and Dispatch Services Agreement with the Broward Sheriff’s Office. The primary reason for suggesting this option relates to a “Seamless Public Safety Services” model, if the City selects BSO for police and Fire/EMS. If the City of Parkland elects to have its own institutional police department, either Broward County, Margate, or Coral Springs would be excellent choices for 911 emergency communications and dispatch.

If the City of Parkland chooses the Broward County Sheriff’s Office to coordinate and provide all public safety services (except Parkland Park Rangers), there is one person responsible for the delivery of those services. If the public safety services are inadequate, customers in Parkland have two ways to seek redress if the BSO is not responsive to their concerns: terminate the service agreements and/or vote for a new sheriff.

Returns on Investment

Regardless of the option or options selected by the City of Parkland, the recommendations in this Report are outlined to enhance any internal service or ways to maximize contractual services. In upgrading the personnel, operational, management and administration of public safety services in a municipality, it is not possible to delineate all



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the anticipated positive outcomes. Improving the quality of life in a community does not necessarily involve quantitative analysis. Thus, it is not possible to outline all the returns on investment. A number of the anticipated returns on investment for the recommendations in this Report include:

1. Improved efficiency in solving crime, which translates into fewer victims of crime.
2. Improved and accurate response time data relative to arrival of fire suppression apparatus;
3. Improved response times to emergency medical service (EMS) calls, with capability to save lives through quick medical measures.
4. Timely analysis of crime and workload for distribution to service providers and stakeholders to prevent crime and promote partnerships with community;
5. Improved supervision of public safety personnel;
6. Integrated command of public safety services: police, fire, EMS, and dispatch;
7. Improved and relevant data for City officials in budget authorizations;
8. Reduced costs in training public safety personnel for other municipalities;
9. System to reward existing employees in seeking upward mobility in a chosen public safety profession;
10. Enhanced resident involvement in partnerships with public safety personnel (such as community policing, citizen patrols, advocates of parks and trails, and parks);
11. Enhanced services of horse patrols, bicycle patrols, through a unified command;
12. Recognition of an 'Accredited Law Enforcement Agency' serving residents;
13. Improved accountability for integrated public safety services;
14. Improved ability to utilize stakeholder and city official input on personnel who don't seem to fit the Parkland model of public safety services;



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15. Improved access to specialized public safety services for public education, crime prevention, crime countermeasures, and feedback from customers;
16. Capability to modify services in a timely manner without additional costs;
17. Capability to terminate contract of service providers based on failure to meet minimum performance measurements;
18. Enhanced use of trained public safety personnel;
19. Less city indirect costs for HRM, Legal, Liability, Insurance; and,
20. Less friction among public safety providers.

Timing

Chapter Eleven of this Blueprint contains a decision matrix to assist the City of Parkland in considering any option, and a suggested timeline on any of the identified options.

Report Review

The City Manager is encouraged to conduct a review of this report, consider relevant input, clarify cost data with the finance department, seek clarification on any proposal from officials in the other municipalities, reorder priorities based on his judgment, and submit an Action Plan to the City Commission for a future course of public safety services in the City of Parkland.

